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I. INTRODUCTION
Thomas Franklin Bowling was seventeen-years-old when he was 
condemned to two life sentences, plus six years and thirty days with 
the possibility of parole, for robbery, marijuana possession, two 
counts of use of a firearm, and capital murder that resulted from a 
botched robbery.1  Seventeen years later, at the age of thirty-four,  he 
became eligible for parole.2  Every year since his original parole date 
of April 26, 2005, the Parole Board has “reviewed and evaluated all 
available information pertaining to [Thomas’s] case and decided not 
to grant [his] parole.”3  Now, over thirty years since his original 
sentencing, he continues to stand before a parole board every year to 
request that it review his case to consider the crimes he committed 
when he was a minor.4  Every year, the Board denies his parole.5 
Since Thomas’s sentencing, the Supreme Court has created 
important and impactful changes to the sentencing practices for 
juveniles.6  Primarily centered around the Eighth Amendment’s ban 
on cruel and unusual punishment,7 the Court held that children “are 
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.”8  
This reaffirms the understanding that life sentences have vastly 
different effects on children and should rarely be employed against 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Baltimore School of Law, 2022; B.A., Government and
Politics, History, University of Maryland, College Park, 2015.  I give my sincerest
appreciation to Professor Neal for her guidance, support, and insight.  I would also
like to give a special thank you to the University of Baltimore Law Review staff for
their tireless efforts to ensure an excellent final product.  Finally, I would like to thank
my friends, family, and coworkers who supported and encouraged me throughout this
entire process.
1. Bowling v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 2019).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 195.
4. Id. at 194-96.
5. Id.  The Parole Board has repeatedly cited the reason for denial as the serious nature
and circumstances leading up to the crime.  Id.  Specifically, at the 2012 hearing, the
Board indicated that release of Thomas “would diminish [the] seriousness of [the]
crime.”  Id. at 195.
6. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that capital punishment is
unconstitutional for minors); see Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (prohibiting
life without parole sentences for juveniles who do not commit homicide); see Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life sentences of life without
parole for juveniles); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016)
(applying holding in Miller retroactively).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
8. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.
2020] Rethinking Juvenile Offender Parole Hearings 223 
them,9 due to their “diminished culpability and greater prospects for 
reform” and because “they are less deserving of the most severe 
punishments.”10 
However, this has led to conflicting responses throughout state 
courts on proper and constitutional juvenile sentencing practices.11  
In cases like Thomas’s, where individuals are given the opportunity 
of parole but are consistently denied,12 convicted juveniles will 
essentially serve a life sentence, never experiencing release in their 
lifetime.13  As life without parole sentences for juveniles have been 
considered cruel and unusual by the Supreme Court,14 these de facto 
life sentences should be as well.15  Through continual parole denials 
and lengthy sentences that outlast a juvenile’s life expectancy, many 
state courts have circumvented the Supreme Court’s holdings that 
juvenile sentencing to life without parole violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment by creating de 
facto life sentences.16  There is an important need for sentencing and 
parole reforms specific to juveniles.17 
This comment will examine de facto life sentences for juveniles 
and the need to view them in the same way as mandatory life without 
parole sentencing.18  Part II examines the historical path the Supreme 
Court took to implement various juvenile-specific Eighth 
Amendment protections from cruel and unusual punishment.19  Part 
III discusses the circuit split in applying these Supreme Court 
holdings to juvenile sentences that essentially amount to life 
sentences.20  Part IV discusses these sentences and what they mean 
9. Id. at 479–80.
10. Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68) (internal quotations omitted).
11. See Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: State Responses,
the Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban on Life Without
Parole for Juveniles is the Only Constitutional Option, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 149,
161 (2017).
12. See, e.g., infra notes 128–35 and accompanying text.
13. Bowling v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2019).
14. See Graham v. Florida, 560 United States 48, 82 (2010); see Miller, 576 U.S. at 473;
see Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736-37 (2016).
15. See Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1194 (9th Cir. 2013); see McKinley v. Butler, 809
F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2016); see also U.S. v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 153 (3d Cir.
2018),  reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018).
16. See Bowling, 920 F.3d at 197-98; see Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 547 (6th Cir.
2012); see United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016).
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Parts II–VI.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
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for a juvenile.21  Finally, Part V will detail what a fair juvenile 
sentence should entail in order to follow the Supreme Court’s ban on 
certain sentencing procedures for juveniles that constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment.22 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since 2005, the Supreme Court has taken substantial steps to
protect juveniles from punishments that it considers to be cruel and 
unusual punishment.23  From the death penalty to mandatory life 
sentences, the court has found that some sentencing schemes are too 
harsh for juveniles because they lack the maturity and mental 
development to understand the potential repercussions and severity of 
their actions.24  Through its holdings, the Court has shown that it 
considers juveniles to be different from adults and, as a result, they 
need different sentencing considerations for crimes committed while 
they were still minors.25  
A. The Supreme Court’s Ban on the Juvenile Death Penalty
The Supreme Court has long found constitutional significance in
the biological differences between childhood and adulthood.26  The 
Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment 
inflicted.”27  The Court  has analyzed this Amendment as it applies to 
juveniles and the impact long or extensive sentences will have on 
them.28 
The modern understanding of the adolescent brain by the 
psychological community is that “adolescents are easily susceptible 
to negative influences and act in an immature way that is, often 
times, not telling of how they will behave as an adult.”29  
Furthermore, there are distinct differences in the development of the 
21. See infra Part IV.
22      See infra Part V. 
23. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012).
24. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-72.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 572-73.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
28. See infra notes 29–47 and accompanying text.
29. Lindsey A. Phillips, United States v. Grant: Does a Term-Of-Years Sentence that
Meets a  Juvenile’s Expected Life Span Violate the Eighth Amendment’s Ban on Cruel
and Unusual  Punishment, 42 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 185, 187 (2018).
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juvenile and adult minds, especially in the portion of the brain that 
controls behavior.30 
The Supreme Court has adopted this thinking and held in several 
cases31 that youth is a mitigating factor that must be considered in 
sentencing as it relates to capital punishment and life without 
parole.32  The Court “derives [this] from the fact that the signature 
qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the 
impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years 
can subside.”33  This created a framework to be followed by courts 
during sentencing that understands the “necessity of referring to ‘the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society’ to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as 
to be cruel and unusual.”34 
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court first considered the 
question of “decency” in sentencing.35  Christopher Simmons was a 
seventeen-year-old boy with no prior convictions,36 who planned and 
carried out a burglary and murder.37  The State sought the death 
penalty.38 
The central issue at his sentencing was Christopher’s age and 
whether the fact that he was “very immature,” “very impulsive,” and 
“very susceptible to being manipulated or influenced” should impact 
his sentencing.39  Furthermore, there was evidence that he had an 
incredibly “difficult home environment” which led him to alcohol 
and drug abuse.40  Although originally sentenced to the death penalty, 
the Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause the death penalty is the most 
severe punishment, the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special 
force” and the use of the penalty “must be limited to those offenders 
who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and 
30. See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & 
L. 741, 742-43 (2000); see Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by
Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and
the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCH. 1009, 1014 (2003).
31. See infra Part II.
32. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473-74 (2012).
33. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
350, 368 (1993)).
34. Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
35. Id. at 605.
36. Id. at 556-58.
37. Id. at 557.
38. Id. at 558.
39. Id. at 559.
40. Id.
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whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of 
execution.’”41 
The Court cited three differences between individuals under 
eighteen and adults that indicate why juveniles should never be 
classified as “among the worst offenders.”42  “First, as any parent 
knows and as the scientific and sociological studies . . . tend to 
confirm, ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are 
more understandable among the young.’”43  This can lead to 
“impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”44  Second, 
“juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences 
and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”45  Finally, “the 
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The 
personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”46 
These differences, distinctly separating them from the list of “worst 
offenders,” are the bases for the Court’s belief that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids the death penalty for any juvenile offenders.47 
B. The Supreme Court’s Review of Juvenile Life Without Parole
Sentences
Following Roper, the Supreme Court began to review various 
sentencing schemes for individuals under the age of eighteen that are 
interpreted as more severe.48  These principles were applied in 
Graham v. Florida, when the Court determined that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits imposing a sentence of life without parole on 
juveniles who did not commit homicide.49  Terrance Graham was a 
juvenile reoffender who was placed on probation when he showed 
remorse and a willingness to change after a burglary, but later 
reoffended with a similar crime.50  Life without parole sentences, the 
Court held, share comparisons with the death penalty that make them 
impossible to impose on juveniles: 
41. Id. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
42. Id. at 569-70.
43. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
44. Id. (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367).
45. Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
46. Id. at 570.
47. See id. at 570, 578.
48. See infra notes 49, 56–57, 63–64, 68–70 and accompanying text.
49. See 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
50. Id. at 53-54.
2020] Rethinking Juvenile Offender Parole Hearings 227 
[L]ife without parole sentences share some characteristics
with death sentences that are shared by no other sentences.
The State does not execute the offender sentenced to life
without parole, but the sentence alters the offender's life by
a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the
most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration,
except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote
possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the
sentence.51
The severity of such sentences on a juvenile in particular—who 
would end up spending much more time in prison in comparison to 
an adult sentenced to the same punishment—created a problem that 
the Court was compelled to correct.52  With all of the reasons 
considered during sentencing, the Court held that a life without 
parole sentence for a nonhomicide juvenile offender is hardly ever 
proportionate or justifiable.53  Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
prohibited its imposition.54  Notably, the Court also indicated that 
while there does not need to be a guarantee of eventual release, there 
must be a realistic opportunity for parole before the end of a life 
sentence.55  
In 2012, the Supreme Court reviewed the imposition of mandatory 
life without parole sentences for juveniles in Miller v. Alabama.56  
The Court’s focus remained on the differences between juveniles and 
adults in their development.57  The impact of the holding in Graham 
is that “youth matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime 
of incarceration without the possibility of parole.”58  
The Court held that mandatory imposition of life sentences without 
the opportunity for parole entirely prevents a judge from taking into 
consideration various important “mitigating qualities of youth,” 
including home life, education, and the background leading up to the 
51. Id. at 69-70.
52. Id. at 70 (“A 16–year–old and a 75–year–old each sentenced to life without parole
receive the same punishment in name only.”).
53. See id. at 74-75.
54. Id. at 71–74 (holding a sentence that does not achieve “the goals of penal sanctions
that have been recognized as legitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation” is too harsh to be imposed.) (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,
25 (2003)).
55. Id. at 82.
56. 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
57. See id. at 469-70.
58. Id. at 473.
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crime.59  Without considering the Roper factors that differentiate 
juveniles from adults60 and instead imposing mandatory sentences, 
the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment” clause is 
violated.61  Moving forward, all courts must take mitigating factors 
related to an individual’s age during their commission of the crime in 
question into consideration before the final sentencing.62 
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of this holding in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, where it held that Miller should be applied 
to all cases retroactively.63  The “foundation stone” for both Miller 
and Montgomery, is that “certain punishments [are] disproportionate 
when applied to juveniles.”64  “Protection against disproportionate 
punishment is the central substantive guarantee of the Eighth 
Amendment and goes far beyond the manner of determining a 
defendant’s sentence.”65  The Montgomery Court held that all 
individuals formerly given a mandatory life without parole sentence 
need not be resentenced, but could be provided relief by being 
considered for parole:  
Extending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders does not 
impose an onerous burden on the States, nor does it disturb 
the finality of state convictions. Those prisoners who have 
shown an inability to reform will continue to serve life 
sentences. The opportunity for release will be afforded to 
those who demonstrate the trust of Miller’s central 
intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes 
are capable of change.66 
As a result, individuals convicted of crimes committed when they 
were juveniles “must be given the opportunity to show their crime 
did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not, their hope for 
some years of life outside prison walls must be restored.”67 
Most recently, the Supreme Court has shown that there is still 
much more to be considered regarding Eighth Amendment 
59. Id. at 476 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
60. See 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
61. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
62. Id.
63. 136 S. Ct. 718, 736-37 (2016).
64. Id. at 732 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 470 n.4).
65. Id. at 732–33 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010)).
66. Id. at 736.
67. Id. at 736-37.
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protections for juveniles.68  In Virginia in 2004, Lee Boyd Malvo was 
convicted of capital murder after he and an adult, later to be referred 
to as the “D.C. Snipers,” terrorized the D.C. Metropolitan area as 
they went on a random shooting spree throughout the community.69 
Malvo, only sixteen at the time, was later sentenced to two terms of 
life imprisonment without parole, plus eight years imprisonment.70 
On appeal, Malvo’s attorneys argued that Miller and Montgomery 
prohibit all life without parole sentences for juveniles, while the State 
asserted these holdings only apply to mandatory sentences.71  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that this 
decision applies not only to mandatory sentences, but also in any 
instance where a juvenile was given life without the possibility of 
parole.72  Virginia’s Attorney General appealed to the Supreme Court 
for a final determination and certiorari was granted.73  Although 
certiorari was later dismissed in response to legislation passed in 
Virginia allowing “all juvenile lifers who committed crimes under 
the age of 18 to seek parole after serving 20 years,”74 by initially 
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court signaled that there is much 
more to be considered in the realm of Eighth Amendment protections 
for juveniles and their sentencing.75 
As these holdings are applied in state courts, Malvo reaffirms that 
the application of certain Eighth Amendment protections have been 
construed and applied differently throughout the country.76  In many 
cases, states fixed this issue by granting an opportunity for parole.77  
However, individuals who were given a sentence that includes the 
opportunity for parole are repeatedly denied this chance and, as a 
result, are still condemned to serve an essential life sentence.78 
68. See Malvo v, Mathena, 893 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1317
(2019), and cert. dismissed, 140 S. Ct. 919 (2020).
69. Id. at 267-68.
70. Id. at 266-67.
71. See id. at 270.
72. See id. at 275.
73. See Malvo, 139 S. Ct. at 1317.
74. Malvo, 140 S. Ct. at 919; Vanessa Romo, U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Dismiss




76. See infra Part III.
77. See Romo, supra note 73.
78. See infra Part IV.
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT IN APPLYING JUVENILE-SPECIFIC
EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS BEFORE
CREATING DE-FACTO LIFE SENTENCES
The Supreme Court has not explicitly stated the constitutionality of 
a sentencing court’s ability to sentence a juvenile to life with 
possibility of parole.79  This ambiguity has created disagreement 
between the Federal Appellate Circuits on whether the sentencing 
courts must also take the inherent differences of children into account 
when sentencing a juvenile to a de facto life sentence.80  In some 
circuits, courts apply Miller and Montgomery to lengthy prison terms 
which deny defendants a “meaningful opportunity to obtain 
release,”81 labeled as de facto life sentences.82  Other circuits hold 
that Eight Amendment protections are triggered when the sentence is 
labeled “life without parole.”83 
A. Some Circuits Extend Juvenile-Specific Eighth Amendment
Protections to Essential Life Sentences
The Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits extend the ideals set forth 
in Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.84  This requires every 
sentencing judge to examine the specifics behind each individual 
case.85  These juvenile-specific protections extend to sentences that 
essentially amount to life in prison.86 
For example, in Moore v. Biter, Roosevelt Moore, then sixteen 
years old, was sentenced to a 254 years and four months term in 
prison.87  Moore submitted evidence that supported he was capable of 
change, including a psychologist report that indicated, “Moore does 
not appear to be fixed in his antisocial value system as he displays a 
sense of motivation to change in overcoming his delinquent 
79. See Bowling, 920 F.3d at 197.
80. See id. at 197-98 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012)).
81. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
82. See Hoesterey, supra note 11, at 169-70.
83. Id. at 170.
84. See infra notes 85–113 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 86–113 and accompanying text.
86. See Bowling v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 192, 197–98 (4th Cir. 2019).
87. Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1186 (9th Cir. 2013).  Moore was found guilty of nine
counts of forcible rape, seven counts of forcible oral copulation, two counts of
attempted second-degree robbery, two counts of second-degree robbery, forcible
sodomy, kidnapping with the specific intent to commit a felony sex offense, genital
penetration by a foreign object, and the unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, all
while using a firearm.  Id.
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lifestyle,” and that he would “benefit from rehabilitation.”88  Moore 
was not eligible for parole until he served half of his sentence.89  He 
would not be permitted an opportunity for parole until he reached 
144 years old.90 
The lower court held that because Moore was serving a term-of-
years sentence, the Graham holding which banned a life without 
parole sentence for juvenile non-homicide offenders did not apply.91  
However, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit overturned this and held that a “sentence of 254 years is 
materially indistinguishable from a life sentence without parole 
because Moore will not be eligible for parole within his lifetime.”92  
As a result, the court held that Moore is entitled to these protections 
under Graham.93 
Similarly, in McKinley v. Butler, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the sentence of Benard 
McKinley, a sixteen-year old who was sentenced to two consecutive 
fifty-year terms, one for murder and one for the use of a firearm 
while committing the crime.94  The Illinois sentencing scheme in 
place at the time did not allow for good-time credits or other early 
release opportunities for individuals who have committed first-degree 
murder.95  McKinley would have been imprisoned for the entire one-
hundred years, “unless, of course, he dies before the age of 116.”96  
88. Id. at 1186-87.
89. Id. at 1187.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1191.
92. Id.  “Moore must live the remainder of his life in prison knowing that he is guaranteed
to die in prison regardless of his remorse, reflection, or growth.”  Id. at 1192.
93. Id. at 1194.
Moore’s sentence guarantees that he will die in prison because the 
trial judge determined at the outset that Moore could not 
rehabilitate. Moore has now spent over half of his life in prison. 
Still, he has no hope of reentering society. His past and future 
efforts to reform are immaterial. Moore’s sentence is 
irreconcilable with Graham’s mandate that a juvenile 
nonhomicide offender must be provided “some meaningful 
opportunity” to reenter society. Thus, Moore’s sentence is 
unconstitutional under Graham. 
Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)). 
94. 809 F.3d 908, 909 (7th Cir. 2016).
95. Id.
96. Id.  By comparison, his accomplice who handed him the gun and told him to shoot the
victim was only sentenced to 17.5 years.  Id.
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This was a discretionary sentence imposed by the judge.97  However, 
the Seventh Circuit was not satisfied with this decision. 
[I]t is such a long term of years (especially given the
unavailability of early release) as to be—unless there is a
radical increase, at present unforeseeable, in longevity
within the next 100 years—a de facto life sentence, and so
the logic of Miller applies. . . But the “children are
different” passage that we quoted earlier from Miller v.
Alabama cannot logically be limited to de jure life
sentences, as distinct from sentences denominated in
number of years yet highly likely to result in imprisonment
for life. The relevance to sentencing of “children are
different” also cannot in logic depend on whether the
legislature has made the life sentence discretionary or
mandatory; even discretionary life sentences must be guided
by consideration of age-relevant factors.98
The Seventh Circuit held that these juvenile-specific considerations 
must be extended to de facto life sentences and such sentences, upon 
serious consideration of the individual’s age, should only be imposed 
on those who are truly deserving of such a lengthy term.99  The court 
vacated the judgment of the lower court and remanded for instruction 
to resentence McKinley while keeping in mind Miller and the Court’s 
concerns surrounding de-facto life sentences that “resulted in a 100-
year prison sentence for a 16-year old.”100 
Finally, in United States v. Grant, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case of Corey Grant, who 
was given a sentence that would make him eligible for parole at the 
age of seventy-two, which was also his life expectancy.101  Grant was 
convicted for conspiracy and racketeering.102  He was given a 
mandatory sentence of life without parole, a concurrent forty-year 
term, and a five-year consecutive term.103  After Miller, Grant 
brought his case back before the District Court for resentencing in 
line with the new holding that mandatory life without parole 
97. Id. at 911.
98. Id. at 911.
99. Id. at 913-14.
100. Id. at 914.
101. 887 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 905 F.3d
285 (3d. Cir. 2018) (mem.).
102. Id. at 134.
103. Id.
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sentences violate the Eighth Amendment.104  He was ultimately 
resentenced to sixty-five years without parole.105  Grant again 
appealed his sentencing, arguing that this new sentencing was so 
lengthy that it still violated Miller because it effectively sentenced 
him to remain in prison with no opportunity for release in his 
lifetime.106 
The court referred to social sciences and life expectancy estimates 
and determined that this sentencing will most likely imprison him for 
the entirety of his life.107  The court held that it violated the Eighth 
Amendment to not consider the length someone’s life may be when 
sentencing a juvenile.108  Moreover, the court in Grant explained 
what it means for an individual to have a “meaningful opportunity for 
release.”109  Such a sentence “must provide for ‘hope’ and a chance 
for ‘fulfillment outside prison walls,’ ‘reconciliation with society,’ 
and ‘the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-
recognition of human worth and potential.’”110  Clarifying that this 
does not mean a “meaningful life” but a “meaningful opportunity for 
release,” a juvenile offender capable of reform must be given some 
opportunity to live outside of prison walls before what would 
generally be considered the age of retirement.111 
Regardless of how other courts prevent de facto life sentences,112 
the Third Circuit is very clear: de facto life without parole is 
irreconcilable with Graham’s and Miller’s mandate that sentencing 
judges must provide non-incorrigible juvenile offenders with a 
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.”113 
B. Some Circuits Do Not Extend Juvenile-Specific Eighth
Amendment Protections to Essential Life Sentences
Conversely, other circuits do not extend juvenile-specific Eighth 
Amendment protections to de facto life without parole sentences.114  
In Bunch v. Smith, for instance, the United States Court of Appeals 
104. Id. at 135–136.
105. Id. at 137.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 147.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 150.
110. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010)).
111. Id. at 150-51.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 84–100.
113. See Grant, 887 F.3d at 142 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).
114. See, e.g., Bowling v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 192, 197-98 (4th Cir. 2019).
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for the Sixth Circuit held that it would not extend the holdings of 
Roper, Miller, and Graham to a de facto life sentence that is the 
result of consecutive sentences.115 
Chaz Bunch was sixteen years old when he was sentenced to 
multiple consecutive fixed terms, totaling eighty-nine years for 
robbing, kidnapping, and raping a woman.116  Although conceding 
that “Bunch’s 89-year aggregate sentence may end up being the 
functional equivalent of life without parole,” the court drew a line 
between Bunch’s situation and the juveniles in the Supreme Court 
holdings.117  The Supreme Court has not addressed consecutive, 
fixed-term sentences for juveniles.118  The Sixth Circuit held the 
failure to address this matter “demonstrates that the Court did not 
even consider the constitutionality of such sentences, let alone clearly 
establish that they can violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishments.”119 
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Robert 
Jefferson was sentenced to life in prison in 1977 for gang related 
violent criminal activity committed at the age of sixteen.120  Under 
state mandatory sentencing guidelines, the sentencing judge was 
required to give him this sentence without taking into consideration 
other mitigating factors behind these criminal offenses.121  After the 
Miller and Montgomery holdings,122 Jefferson appealed his case and 
115. 685 F.3d 546, 549, 551 (6th Cir. 2012).
116. Id. at 548.  He was found guilty of three counts of complicity to commit rape, one
count of aggravated robbery, one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery,
one count of kidnaping, one count of misdemeanor menacing, all while carrying a
firearm.  Id.
117. Id. at 551.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 552. The Court goes on to discuss the circuit split as follows:
This split demonstrates that Bunch’s expansive reading of 
Graham is not clearly established. Perhaps the Supreme Court, or 
another federal court on direct review, will decide that very 
lengthy, consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders violate the Eighth Amendment. But until 
the Supreme Court rules to that effect, Bunch’s sentence does not 
violate clearly established federal law. 
Id. 
120. See United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016).  He was
convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, drug trafficking, and the firebombing
murder and drive-by shooting of a drug debtor and bystander.  Id.
121. Id.
122. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); see Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.
Ct. 718 (2016).
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was instead granted a 600 month sentence.123  He argued that it is a 
de facto life sentence.124 
The Eighth Circuit declined to extend the Miller holding in this 
case because it held Miller only applied to mandatory sentencing 
guidelines.125  The court agreed that “a federal court considering 
whether to impose a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile 
homicide offender under the federal advisory guidelines regime must 
weigh the [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] sentencing factors ‘as informed’ by 
the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”126  
However, the court held the sentencing adequately addressed his 
“extraordinary success” that “clearly weighed in [his] favor,” but his 
record detailed crimes too serious to shorten his term.127 
Most recently, in Bowling v. Director, Virginia Department of 
Corrections, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit reviewed the sentence of a seventeen-year-old who was 
sentenced to life with parole for capital murder, robbery, marijuana 
possession, and two counts of use of a firearm.128  Here, Bowling was 
actually given a sentence that allowed him the opportunity for 
parole.129  However, Bowling argued that although he has this 
opportunity, his continued denial by the Parole Board amounts to a 
de facto life sentence.130  The Fourth Circuit disagrees.131 
123. See Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1018.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 1019.
126. Id. at 1020.
127. Id.
Jefferson has demonstrated that he is amenable to rehabilitation. 
In the time that he has been in prison, approximately sixteen and 
one-half years, Jefferson has no disciplinary history. In addition, 
Jefferson completed 24 courses of study, including college-level 
courses such as logic, ethics and ancient philosophy. He has been 
continuously employed in prison, working in food service, 
sanitation and as a medical orderly. In addition, Jefferson 
convenes a weekly session of Bible study. Prison staff have 
commented that Jefferson serves as a positive role model for other 
inmates in the Life Style Intervention Class. 
Id. 
128. 920 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 2019).
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 198-99.
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The Fourth Circuit held that although Graham and Miller require a 
meaningful opportunity for release,132 Bowling’s continued 
proceedings before the Board satisfy that requirement.133  The court 
determined that it did not extend the Eighth Amendment juvenile-
specific protections to “juvenile offender[s] who [have] and will 
continue to receive parole consideration.”134  It further asserts that 
regardless of Bowling’s repeated denials for the opportunity of 
parole, he is receiving the form of relief received by those juveniles 
remedied by Miller, which is simply parole consideration, not 
release.135 
The conflicting application and understanding of juvenile-specific 
Eighth Amendment protections across state courts creates a large 
discrepancy in juvenile sentencing across the country.136  With three 
circuits extending these protections and three others not,137 juveniles 
convicted in certain jurisdictions are sentenced in a manner that 
ensures they will never see release for crimes committed when they 
were young.138  However, the Supreme Court has continually held 
that age should matter in determining an individual’s sentence and 
this should be required in every sentencing hearing for a juvenile.139  
This should also be considered once they come before a parole 
board.140  
IV. THE MEANING OF AN ESSENTIAL LIFE SENTENCE
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that mandatory life
sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment because 
children are inherently different from adults, and those differences 
must be taken into account for every individual juvenile.141  Courts 
across the country have responded in different ways.142   
132. See id. at 198.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 199 (citing Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016)).
136. See supra Part III.
137. See supra Part III.
138. See supra Section III.B.
139. See supra Part II.
140. See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
141. See supra Part II.
142. See generally Sarah Mehta, Growing Up and Growing Old in Prison, ACLU (Nov.
29,  2017, 2:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/juvenile-justice/youth-incarceration
/growing-and-growing-old-prison [https://perma.cc/KPJ3-CJ83] (discussing different
prison sentences received by juveniles  throughout the country).
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The Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery holdings,143 while 
significant steps, have not stopped many states from sentencing 
children to spend the rest of their lives in prison with no real 
opportunity for parole or eventual release.144  The response in certain 
jurisdictions has been to eliminate mandatory life sentences that were 
deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and replace it with 
sentences so long that the juveniles are destined to spend the rest of 
their life in prison.145  This sentencing structure creates these de facto 
or essential life sentences that arise with a “juvenile homicide 
offender who might be sentenced to die in prison without a 
meaningful opportunity to gain early release based on demonstrated 
rehabilitation.”146 
Life without parole sentences, although not as severe as the death 
penalty, share many similarities to it.147  In Graham, Justice Kennedy 
suggested that as juveniles are more capable of change and have 
lower culpability, they should not be the recipients of the most severe 
punishments.148  Similarly, life with the possibility of parole 
sentences, that present little to no opportunity of release, share a 
comparable diminished hope of release.149 
States have begun to implement minimum sentences for juveniles 
convicted of serious crimes and maximums sentences that include 
life with the opportunity of parole at a certain number of years.150  
However, these time limits do not give hope to juveniles who know 
these parole hearings will not grant them a real chance for release.151  
When juveniles such as Thomas Bowling are given the opportunity 
of parole, but their rehabilitation efforts since their imprisonment are 
being dwarfed by the severity of the crime during their parole 
considerations, this eliminates any real chance that they will ever be 
released for a crime they committed when still under the age of 
eighteen.152  This eliminates all hope for release that is essential for 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 35–66.
144. See Mehta, supra note 142.
145. Julie Burke, Comment, De-Facto-Life and the Rare Juvenile, 37 MISS. C. L. REV. 264,
278 (2019).
146. State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 660 (Wash. 2017).  The Supreme Court of Washington
held  that Miller clearly applied to a juvenile sentenced to eighty-five years in prison.
See id.
147. Kallee Spooner & Michael Vaughn, Sentencing Juvenile Homicide Offenders: A 50-
State  Survey, 5 VA. J. CRIM. L. 130, 137 (2017).
148. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 70–71 (2010).
149. See  infra notes 151–55.
150. See Spooner & Vaughn, supra note 147, at 146–51.
151. See infra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
152. Bowling v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2019).
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encouraging rehabilitation.153  For juveniles who will in the end serve 
more time than any adult convicted, due to the age they began their 
sentence, Justice Kennedy referred to life in prison as granting “no 
chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for 
reconciliation with society, no hope.”154  Repeated denials of parole 
create similar scenarios to life without parole where “a young person 
who knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before life’s 
end has little incentive to become a responsible individual.”155  
Without reforming parole hearings to ensure a fair review by the 
Parole Board that gives a meaningful opportunity for release, there is 
less encouragement for rehabilitation, and these defendants will 
essentially spend the remainder of their lives in prison.156  
V. PROPER JUVENILE SENTENCING
Essential life sentences raise the same issues that are present with
mandatory life sentencing and should be treated the same.157  In 
Graham, the Supreme Court stated a sentence lacking “any legitimate 
penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the 
offense.”158  These penological justifications include incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence.159  The length of a term is 
not a deterrent to a juvenile who is impulsive and immature.160  Life 
sentences that repeatedly deny the opportunity for parole or parole 
considerations inherently reduce any motivation for rehabilitation.161   
In the case of Thomas Bowling, the Parole Board’s repeated 
denials of his parole have been cited by the Board’s members as 
necessary retribution due to the severity of his crime.162  However, 
these continued denials over the past fifteen years indicate that there 
is no consideration of his rehabilitative efforts.163  Without raising his 
attempts at rehabilitation, it ignores the already established idea that 
juveniles are different from adults.164  The court in Graham 
153. Spooner & Vaughn, supra note 147, at 137.
154. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).
155. Id.
156. See id. at 70–71, 74.
157. See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
158. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71.
159. Id. at 72.
160. Id.
161. Burke, supra note 145, at 283.
162. See Bowling v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2019).
163. Id. at 195–96.
164. See supra Section II.A.
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“emphasized the importance of giving juvenile offenders a chance to 
become rehabilitated.”165 
As a result, rehabilitation and meaningful opportunities for parole 
must become the norm in sentencing juveniles across the country.166  
However, juveniles have less access to necessary rehabilitative 
services than other adult prisoners, and without the opportunity for 
parole, they may be less motivated to take advantage of ones that are 
available.167 
Currently, the parole system uses a risk assessment that anticipates 
recidivism.168  The parole board makes determinations by reviewing 
case summaries, recommendations by analysts, testimony from 
victims, and in person interviews of the defendant.169  Often, the 
parole board members weigh crime severity, victim impact, and the 
prisoner’s offense higher than steps taken for rehabilitation.170  In 
juveniles, this is not the most effective manner to consider parole 
eligibility.171  In line with the Supreme Court’s holdings on juvenile-
specific Eighth Amendment protections, someone’s age at the time of 
offense should be recognized as an incredibly mitigating 
circumstance, as well as steps taken for rehabilitation since 
incarceration.172  A meaningful opportunity for parole must include a 
parole hearing that considers these factors.173 This can be created 
with reviews completed by the professional individuals the juveniles 
work directly with while in prison and reports by psychologists of 
true rehabilitation and progress.174  This progress must be given 
greater weight than the original crime.175  
Parole hearings must not only consider how children are different 
but must also review the individual as he or she has matured into an 
165. Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, THE SENTENCING PROJECT
(Feb. 25,  2020), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without
-parole/ [https://perma.cc/42Y7-D5BA].
166. See infra notes 173–83 and accompanying text.
167. See Rovner, supra note 165.
168. Matthew Drecun, Note, Cruel and Unusual Parole, 95 TEX. L. REV. 707, 711 (2017).
169. Id. at 711–12.
170. See id. at 712.
171. See infra notes 172–79 and accompanying text.
172. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473-76 (2012); see Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48,  77-79 (2010).
173. See infra notes 174–83 and accompanying text.
174. See Courtney B. LaHaie, A Model for Juvenile Parole Reform: California’s Youth
Offender Parole Hearings Challenge the Modern Parole System and Apply the
Fundamental Principles in Graham and Miller to the Release Decision-Making
Process, 11 CAL. LEGAL HIST. 475,  502–03 (2016).
175. See id. at 502.
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adult.176  While the severity of crimes can indicate evil or malice in 
an individual, they can also be indicative of an immature or irrational 
juvenile acting without thinking of the consequences.177  As seen in 
earlier discussed cases,178 the Court has held that oftentimes these 
crimes can be traced to immaturity, impressionability, and a poor 
home environment, and that rehabilitation can help.179 
After a certain period of time, there must be a guaranteed 
opportunity for consideration by a parole board.180  This opportunity 
should take into account both the age of the individual at the time of 
the offense and their actions since imprisonment and entrance into 
adulthood.181  Many other countries mandate a parole review after ten 
to fifteen years and “[i]f adequate rehabilitation has not occurred 
during these years in prison, as decided by experts, the individual 
may remain in prison and his/her case be reviewed again in another 
few years.”182  Some states have taken definitive action to implement 
such standards.183 
California is a recent leader in this effort.184  Beginning in 2013, 
the California legislature passed a bill that created “Youth Offender 
Parole Hearings.”185  This law requires that fifteen to twenty-five 
years after imprisonment, individuals who committed offenses as 
juveniles automatically come up for parole review.186  The overall 
intent and goal of these massive reforms were stated as follows:  
The purpose of this act is to establish a parole eligibility 
mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for 
crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the 
opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that 
he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity, in 
accordance with . . . the decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida and Miller v. 
Alabama. . . . It is the intent of the Legislature to create a 
process by which growth and maturity of youthful offenders 
176. See infra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Section II.A.
178. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
179. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 559 (2005).
180. See infra notes 181–205.
181. See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
182. Rovner, supra note 165, at 5.
183. See infra notes 184–89 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 185–89 and accompanying text.
185. LaHaie, supra note 174, at 502.
186. See Rovner, supra note 165, at 5.
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can be assessed and a meaningful opportunity for release 
established.187 
The primary difference between juvenile parole hearings and adult 
ones is that the parole board must “give great weight to the 
diminished culpability of youth . . . and any subsequent growth and 
increased maturity of the prisoner.”188  Further, all evaluations must 
be given by licensed psychologist who understand these 
differences.189 
Additionally, following the American Psychological Association’s 
findings that brain development continues through late 
adolescence,190 the legislature created a timeframe for guaranteed 
parole eligibility.191  Even those with the harshest sentences must be 
up for parole within 15 years of incarceration.192  Although juveniles 
are required to show significant rehabilitation during their time prior 
to the parole hearing, this law now requires the parole board to give 
immense weight to the age factor.193 
Granting juveniles the chance for a meaningful opportunity of 
parole requires more than just a hearing.194  Following the lead of 
California, a meaningful opportunity for parole will require that all 
individuals up for parole undergo evaluation by a psychologist to 
generate a report which is to be submitted to the parole board in 
question.195  The psychologist’s report—which should include a 
recommendation and account for the individual’s age and related 
mitigating circumstances at the time of the offense—should be given 
the most weight.196  If a parole board disagrees with the 
psychologist’s recommendation, they must issue a decision detailing 
reasons that include more than the original severity of the crime.197  
All juveniles should be given the chance for rehabilitation and 
redemption; thus, evaluations performed by psychologists—with 
consideration of a juvenile’s ability to truly change—should be 
understood to be the most important factor in granting parole.198  In 
187. LaHaie, supra note 174, at 502.
188. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (2018).
189. LaHaie, supra note 174, at 502.
190. See id. at 504.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 505.
194. See infra notes 195–200 and accompanying text.
195. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(f)(1) (2020).
196. See supra notes 172–75, 188–89 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 165–79 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 180–95 and accompanying text.
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Miller, the Court adopted the American Psychological Association’s 
belief that “children are different.”199  Following the Association’s 
determination that “only 16 percent of young adolescents who scored 
in the top quintile of a juvenile psychopathy measure would 
eventually be assessed as psychopathic at age 24,”200 there should be 
large weight given to the assessments performed by psychologists 
trained to see these alerting factors and the possibility of reform. 
There must be uniform opportunities for convicted juveniles across 
the country to have access to meaningful parole opportunities, no 
matter which the state they are convicted in.201  The California model 
is a strong standard all states should look to.202  Parole hearings 
should be productive and all encompassing, rather than a show that 
will hardly ever result in release.203  With the different circuits split 
on how to handle the matter of de facto life sentences,204 there must 
be mandated requirements across the country that dictate youth as a 
major and mitigating factor, and grant all juveniles a meaningful 
opportunity to show all rehabilitative efforts completed throughout 
their sentence.205 
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has declared that
the age of individuals when committing a crime matters and should 
be considered in overall sentencing.206  However, this holding has 
only eliminated mandatory sentencing that does not account for 
factors of youth, mitigating circumstances, and the use of the death 
penalty for juvenile offenders.207  Thus, courts now implement 
equally egregious essential life sentences that place juvenile 
offenders behind prison walls for just as long as they would have 
been prior to Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.208  There must be a 
uniform rule granting every juvenile offender the opportunity for a 
parole hearing that takes into consideration the rehabilitative efforts 
199. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012).
200. Hoesterey, supra note 11, at 181 (quoting Brief for Am. Psychol. Ass’n et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos.
10-9646, 10-9647) 2012 WL 174239, at *21).
201. See supra notes 147–56 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 184–95 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 157–79 and accompanying text.
204. See supra Part III.
205. See supra notes 157–65.
206. See supra Part II.
207. See supra Part II.
208. See supra Part IV.
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and psychological analysis and recommendations of every individual 
standing before the board.209  Without it, the disproportionate 
sentencing practices rejected in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery 
will continue to thrive, only in different forms.210 
209. See supra Part V.
210. See supra Section III.B; see also supra Parts IV–V.
